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Theme: Since the 1990s, the Turkish military have emerged as a force defending 
Turkey’s secular democracy in the political realm. How will they react towards the upsurge 
in Islamic influence and the other issues facing the country? 
 
 
Summary: The Turkish military began to Westernise in the late 18th century and became 
a strictly secular institution under Atatürk in the early 20th century. The military are 
Turkey’s most Westernised institution and a bastion of secularism. What is more, they 
consistently rank as the most popular and widely respected institution in Turkey. Since the 
1990s, the Turkish military have emerged as a force defending Turkey’s secular 
democracy in the political realm. What explains the military’s behaviour? Given the recent 
rumblings in Turkey over its presidential, and upcoming parliamentary elections –the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), with an Islamist pedigree and currently in 
government, is at the centre of the controversy– a review of the Turkish military’s 
commitment to secularism will help reveal how it might react in the near future to a 
number of important issues. 
 
 
 
Analysis: On 22 July Turkey faces crucial parliamentary elections, which follow in the 
footsteps of an important political crisis. Since adopting its current constitution in 1982, 
Turkey has elected four Presidents. Turkey’s recent failure to elect a new President has 
brought about its worst political crisis of the past two decades. This development marks a 
new era in Turkish political life, which has been dominated by the AKP since the 
November 2002 elections. Although the Turkish military, known as the ‘defenders of 
Turkish secularism’, had distanced themselves from Turkish politics after 2002, they are 
increasingly assuming their position of political power. On 27 April the military issued an 
Internet declaration to the effect that ‘radical Islamic understanding… has been expanding 
its sphere with encouragement from politicians and local authorities’. The statement 
added: ‘the Turkish armed forces… are staunch defenders of secularism… and will 
display their position and attitudes when it becomes necessary’. 
 
The 22 July elections and the presidential elections will be a platform for political contest 
between the AKP and not only the secular parties but also the secular courts of justice. At 
this juncture, the military’s statement could be seen as a warning to the AKP. From where 
do the Turkish military gain such confidence and what are the roots of the military’s 
position as the ‘defenders of Turkish secularism’? Given the elections and rising political 
tensions between the AKP and the secular Turks, how will the military act vis-à-vis the 
AKP government? The answers to these questions should provide clues for the future of 
Turkish politics, as well as to how the military will react to issues such as accession to the 
European Union (EU) and the fight against terrorism, especially the Kurdistan Workers 
Party’s (PKK) presence in northern Iraq. 
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The Turkish Military: Three Self-Perceived Roles 
 
A One-Track Western Mind 
Understanding the Turkish military’s commitment to secularism necessitates a review of 
Turkey’s journey to the West. Contrary to common wisdom, the Turks’ embrace of the 
West is not a 20th-century phenomenon but rather took place during the Ottoman period 
after a long period of soul searching. Following the Ottoman defeat in Vienna in 1683 and 
the subsequent loss of territories, the Ottoman elite painfully conceded to Western 
superiority. They concluded that the only way to defeat Europe was to become European. 
Because the most obvious sign of Ottoman weakness compared to Europe was in the 
military realm, the empire decided to create a European military. In 1773, the Sultan 
established the Imperial School of Naval Engineering, a modern, Western military school, 
designed to create a Western navy, the military backbone of all European powers at the 
time. This school and the institutions which followed provided the backbone of a secular, 
Western army. Because of the Ottoman modernisation experience, the military became 
Turkey’s first and most-westernised institution. As a result of this experience stretching 
back to 1773, the Turkish military’s memory of being Western is older than the memory of 
France being a republic. The Turkish military, fully secularised under Atatürk, remain 
committed to being Western and secular because they have no memory of being anything 
else. 
 
The Guardians of Secularism 
It is no coincidence that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leading figure of westernisation in 
modern Turkey, arose from the Ottoman army. At the end of World War I, Atatürk not only 
liberated Turkey but also established a fully Western republic that recognised only secular 
laws and provided only secular education. Atatürk’s vision was that the military, as 
modern Turkey’s most Western institution, would guard over his legacy, including 
secularism. To this day, the military are legally assigned the task of preserving Turkey’s 
secular constitution. Article 35 of the Internal Service Law of the military stipulates that the 
Turkish Armed Forces are responsible for ‘guarding and defending the Turkish republic as 
defined by the constitution’. 
 
The military have acted on this legal obligation. Most recently, in the late 1990s, they 
joined a public campaign to force the Welfare Party (RP), the AKP’s mother party, out of 
government. 
 
The Most Respected Institution 
Regardless of their legal authority, what explains the Turkish military’s comfort in 
intervening in politics? Turkish opinion polls consistently show the military as the most 
respected institution in the country. A 2002 poll by Washington DC-based Pew Center 
demonstrated that the military are the institution most liked by the Turks, more than the 
government, the parliament, the media and the mosques. 
 
From where do the military derive their popularity? First, the fact that the military under 
Atatürk liberated Turkey from an invincible occupation ensures that all Turks across the 
political spectrum, including Islamists, recognize them as a national saviour. A second 
contributing factor is that they conscript across all of Turkey’s social classes, ethnic 
groups and regions. Acting as a social mixer and a democratising institution, the military 
provide a rare chance for upward mobility. Thirdly, many Turks respect the military 
because, unlike the political classes, they are not corrupt. 
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The Turkish Military: Two Popular Views 
 
Yes to the Military for ‘Political Housecleaning’ 
Popular trust in the military has, however, created a sense of ‘political atrophy’. Secular 
parties and the population at large often turn to the military for ‘political housecleaning’, 
rather than taking political action themselves. The middle classes especially take comfort 
in the military as a secular firewall against Islamism. One consequence of this attitude is 
that the prospect of having an Islamist party in power, such as in 1996 when the RP came 
to power in a coalition government, does not create an immediate panic or flight of capital. 
 
No to the Military’s Candidates 
Despite the military’s popularity, the Turks have developed a cynical attitude to military-
backed candidates. Although the people support the military’s role in political 
housecleaning, they shy away from voting for parties that appear to be the military’s 
candidates. In the aftermath of Turkey’s last coup in 1980, for instance, the military-
backed Nationalist Democracy Party, led by a retired general, came last in the elections, 
while the party least favoured by the military, Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party (ANAP), 
emerged victorious. This shows the Turkish public’s political bias against candidates 
favoured by the military and towards those considered the military’s underdog. 
 
The Turkish Military vs. the Islamists 
 
Notwithstanding their puzzling relationship with the public at large, the Turkish military feel 
comfortable intervening on behalf of secularism as long as they have popular backing for 
their policy. This confidence is best illustrated in the way the military dealt with the RP in 
the 1990s. 
 
Turkish Islamists, long a marginal movement, profited from the winds of change in the 
1990s following the fall of communism and the subsequent failure of the Turkish left to 
reinvent itself. At this juncture, casting itself as the party of the working and lower-middle 
classes, the RP received 21% of the vote in December 1995 and came to power in a 
coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (DYP). 
 
The February 28 Process 
The RP-DYP government became controversial when the RP launched an Islamist 
agenda, announcing, among other things, that it would create an Islamic M-8, a gathering 
of Muslim countries to balance the G-8. 
 
The RP’s policies, laced with elements of sharia, such as banning alcohol in RP-run city 
municipal restaurants and creating separate public transport systems for men and 
women, led to a strong domestic backlash. Street demonstrations by secular unions, 
political parties and NGOs ensued. Public criticism of the RP government by ‘Istanbul’ –
influential business lobbies, NGOs and the media– culminated in an anti-RP front. 
‘Istanbul’ threw its support behind ‘Ankara’, composed of secular parties, the military and 
the unions. In this regard, the military acted as the grand arbiter, supporting policies 
against the RP. For instance, a Turkish civil society campaign known as ‘One Minute of 
Darkness for Eternal Light’, in which people protested against the RP by turning their 
lights off for one minute at 8:00 pm every day, got a boost when the Turkish Chief of 
Staff’s offices joined in. 
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On 28 February 1997, in what is known as the ‘February 28 Process’, the Turkish National 
Security Council, which includes the military, presented the RP government with a 
memorandum identifying unconstitutional Islamist acts under RP rule. Faced with 
mounting domestic discontent and street demonstrations of millions, the RP stepped 
down from government in June 1997. 
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Enter the AKP 
 
While the RP failed to challenge Turkish secularism, the AKP has succeeded. The AKP 
hopes to fare well in the approaching parliamentary and presidential elections. The AKP’s 
success is rooted in the lesson it accurately drew from 1996-97: backing from ‘Istanbul’ 
(the business sector and media) and steady popular support are critical to surviving a 
secular onslaught. The party’s pro-business policies, along with the support of the Turkish 
media (owned by large Istanbul businesses), have helped the AKP achieve some of this 
support, at least for the time being. 
 
What Next Between the AKP and the Military? 
 
On 1 September 2006 General Yasar Buyukanit became Turkey’s new Chief of Staff. 
Compared with his predecessor, General Hilmi Ozkok, who entered office around the 
same time as the AKP government in 2002, General Buyukanit is more vocal on issues 
related to secularism. In this regard, General Buyukanit’s term marks a crucial era in 
military-civilian relations in Turkey. The following will be some of the critical issues to 
watch. 
 
Secular Education 
One of Atatürk’s fundamental reforms was the creation of a secular universal education 
system. Today, the AKP seems to be challenging this system through the imam-hatip 
schools and turban issues. 
 
The Imam-Hatip Schools 
Turkey’s educational philosophy is European, directing high-school students towards either 
an academic or vocational track. Students on an academic track at regular high schools 
(lise) continue on to universities, whereas students on the vocational track get preferential 
treatment in applying to university majors in their professional field. 
 
The imam-hatip schools (IHS) were established in the 1950s as vocational schools to train 
imams (clerics) and hatips (preachers). Later on, however, they emerged as an 
alternative, religious track to secular education as the number of students who enrolled in 
these schools exceeded the number of imams and hatips that were needed. As a result, 
IHS graduates began to overwhelmingly enter universities as public administration and 
law majors. By the mid-1990s, the schools had become so widespread that in the conflict 
between RP/Islamists and the secular block/military in 1997, IHS constituted a point of 
friction. In the end, secular pressures forced the implementation of new laws stipulating 
that IHS graduates would be systematically directed to enter universities as theology 
majors as was originally intended. 
 
This barrier stymied the growth of IHS, and the number of students at these schools 
dropped to 64,534 in 2002. Since the rise of the AKP government however, the number of 
IHS students has increased. In 2005, 108,064 youths studied at the IHS. The AKP has 
created loopholes allowing IHS students to transfer to academic high schools before 
graduation, thus granting them preferential treatment in going on to non-theology majors 
in universities. The entry of the IHS graduates into university departments other than 
theological fields is not only a technical matter but has led to a fierce internal debate about 
universal secular education, a pillar of Turkish secularism. 
 
The Turban 
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Just like the IHS issue, controversy over the turban (a specific headscarf that the secular 
courts regard as a sign of political Islam) is an issue about education. Conservative 
Muslim women in Turkey have always covered their heads as a sign of modesty, 
choosing among a variety of styles, including east and south European-looking 
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handkerchiefs, known as esarp, worn by urban women; a more conservative late-
Ottoman-era version called basortusu; and a gauze cloth, yazma/yemeni, worn by rural 
women. According to polls, in 2006, less than half (48%) of Turkish women used these 
forms of head covering. The turban, however, is a specific headgear that first appeared in 
Turkey in the early 1980s after other predominantly Muslim countries. The turban exposes 
no hair, and unlike the other forms, it even covers parts of the face in a tight-fitting form 
while extending over the shoulders. Despite efforts to promote the turban, especially by 
younger generations to popularise it as a symbol of Islamism and virtue in the 1990s, it 
never became a mass phenomenon. What is more, due to secular pressures since 1997, 
the number of women who wear the turban has dropped. Today, 11% of Turkish women 
wear the turban, compared with 16% in 1999. 
 
The Turkish courts have ruled against the turban for violating Turkey’s secular constitution. 
In due course, the Turkish Higher Board of Education, a council of university rectors and a 
secular bastion, banned the turban on university campuses. This ban has created a 
controversy on campuses; students who wear the turban took their case to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which upheld the Turkish court’s ruling. 
 
The imam-hatip and turban issues are the most acrimonious topics in Turkish domestic 
politics. Any AKP moves to alter the status quo on these issues, especially on the more-
iconic turban question, will likely face strong discontent and resistance from the high 
courts and military. Turkey’s current political crisis over the presidential elections is 
generated by a concern for these very issues. 
 
The Turkish President has the prerogative to appoint members of high courts and select 
university presidents from a list compiled by university academic personnel. In this regard, 
an AKP-elected President could use his executive power to tilt the balance on divisive 
issues in the AKP’s favour. A possible scenario could be one in which the President 
selects university rectors who overturn the turban ban on campuses and allow IHS 
graduates into non-theology majors. This would be followed by the appointment of high 
court judges who would review the constitutionality of any changes on the turban and 
imam-hatip issues and vote in favour of them. Hence, the presidential elections, and even 
more importantly, the behaviour of the new president, mark the beginning of a new era for 
Turkish politics as well as for secularism. 
 
The PKK 
The AKP and the military also disagree on the PKK issue. On 1 October 2006 the PKK 
declared a unilateral ceasefire to shield itself from an anticipated Turkish campaign to root 
out its bases in northern Iraq. On 2 October 2006 Erdogan gave at least partial backing to 
this move, saying he expected that ‘if the terrorist organisation keeps its word, no 
operation will be undertaken [by the Turkish military] without reason’. General Ilker 
Basbug, commander of the Turkish Land Forces, dismissed Erdogan and the PKK, 
asserting that the struggle against the PKK would ‘continue until they are destroyed at the 
root’ in Turkey and northern Iraq, where it is based. 
 
How Will the Turkish Military React? 
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Whether the issue is the turban, the fight against the PKK or Turkey’s EU accession, how 
will the Turkish military react over the next few days? The Turkish military see themselves 
as the most trusted institution and as the guardians of secularism. Yet they are prone to 
thinking and acting like a ‘political party’, with their own vision of a secular Turkey. The 
military position themselves as the grand arbiters to safeguard the secular constitution, 
while thriving on public support. Because they care about being popular and respected, 
the military seek and build up public support to promote their vision of a secular Turkey. In 
other words, the military will only do what they consider has popular support. 
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Domestic Politics 
The military’s pro-secular stance against the RP government of the 1990s is expressing 
itself against the AKP today. Accordingly, the military appear to have the acceptance of 
the secular Turks who aim to block the AKP from winning the July elections and choosing 
Turkey’s next President. Should the AKP win enough seats in July to form a government 
and elect the next President, the military will seek to build up public support to confront 
the AKP, especially on the turban and imam-hatip issues. In this regard, the military will 
interpret the continuation of recent anti-AKP demonstrations as popular support for their 
position against the AKP –á la February 28–. However, the military will also have to strike 
the right balance in two calculations: 
 
• First, the military will need to find a balance between the two popular positions 
towards it. While the secular Turks will appreciate a helping hand from the military in 
‘political housecleaning’ vis-à-vis the AKP, society at large will resent any heavy-
handed military efforts to impose its own political candidates. 
• Secondly, should the AKP be the underdog in the current confrontation with the 
military, this will strengthen the political support for the party. 
 
Hence, the Turkish military will likely act as an arbiter, supporting, but not leading, the 
efforts to block the AKP’s political ambitions. In this regard, the secular political parties, 
the courts and perhaps the media are likely allies for the military. 
 
The PKK 
Acting as a political party and systemic arbiter, the military will draw support from their 
success against the PKK. For the military, defeating the PKK is a sine qua non in the fight 
against terrorism. That the AKP government has not delivered security on the PKK issue 
since 2002 –the PKK has recently killed dozens of Turks– increases the military’s desire 
to take credit on the PKK issue themselves. This could happen in two ways: first, with the 
arrest and handing over to the Turkish military of the PKK’s leadership in northern Iraq by 
the US. This tactic would surely give the Turkish military strong popular support. The 
second method would be direct Turkish military intervention in northern Iraq to eliminate 
the PKK bases used to train terrorists for attacks into Turkey. While this method could 
provide the military with public support, it might prove more burdensome, as any 
intervention into northern Iraq would incur criticism from the US and the EU. 
 
The EU 
Even if Turkey’s EU accession process has come to a near halt due to the hurdles set by 
a number of EU member states, the Turkish military will remain supportive of the country’s 
entry in the EU. While some Turks, including some members of the military, have warned 
that the ‘EU is diluting Turkish sovereignty’, this is not a worrying development. Many EU 
members have strong ‘sovereignist’ institutions and parties against the Union, and the 
‘sovereignist’ anti-EU arguments are not unique to Turkey, nor should they be considered 
alarming. Ultimately, the Turkish military’s identity, committed to upholding Turkey’s 
Western orientation, will play a significant role in supporting EU accession. However, 
given the Turkish military’s behaviour as a political party that reflects and supports popular 
sentiments –the Turks are ‘Eurosceptic Europhiles’ on EU accession– the Turkish military 
will likely ask that the country’s EU process be fair and not include Turkey-specific 
conditions. Indeed, the Turkish military would be more closely involved in the EU if the 
accession process were to be close-ended, as it has been de facto for all the 21 members 
that have held accession talks. 
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Conclusion: It could be argued therefore, that the way the Turkish military think is not 
motivated by short-term cost/benefit calculations, but that it rests on a long-standing self-
perception. The Turkish military act as the guardians of secularism, have an unwavering 
Western orientation and also rest on massive public support that brings about a great deal 
of responsibility. Such a self-perception and self-identification clashed with the Islamists in 
1997 (during what is referred to as the ‘February 28 process’) and led to the 
memorandum issued by the National Security Council that criticised the Islamist Welfare 
Party’s stance against secularism. Today, in a similar process of confrontation between 
the Islamists and the military, the main issues are the Imam-Hatip and the turban as well 
as the ways of confronting the PKK problem. Perhaps, the most important sui generis 
quality of Turkey’s democracy is the presence of the military in it. As long as the Turkish 
military are a respected institution, it is unlikely for their presence in Turkey’s democracy 
to wither away. 
 
Soner Cagaptay 
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